CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Working Paper on Transfer of Fissionable Material Obtained by the Destruction of Nuclear Weapons

I. INTRODUCTION

A. This paper describes the destruction of nuclear weapons and transfer of contained fissionable material to peaceful uses under international safeguards.

B. This proposal for the destruction of nuclear weapons is linked to the United States proposal for a cutoff of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons, and would implement the transfer of fissionable material from past production to peaceful purposes.

C. The illustrative quantities of U-235 of weapons grade discussed before the ENDC on February 13, 1964 (ENDC/PV 166) are reaffirmed by the United States. In addition, the plutonium contained in the destroyed weapons would also be transferred to peaceful uses.

II. NATURE OF DESTRUCTION

A. The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would each agree to transfer highly enriched uranium* and plutonium obtained from nuclear weapons destroyed for that purpose to peaceful purposes under IAEA or similar safeguards.

B. The United States of America would destroy a sufficient number of nuclear weapons to obtain 60,000 kg of U-235, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would destroy a sufficient number of nuclear weapons to obtain 40,000 kilograms of U-235 for this transfer.

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* A minimum assay of ___% by weight would be counted toward the agreed quantities according to the amount of U-235 contained in the metal.

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C. Plutonium from the destroyed weapons in the amount of not less than _____kg on the part of the US and not less than _____kg on the part of the USSR would be obtained from this transfer. (Actual amounts to be determined and inserted during negotiations.)

D. The nuclear weapons to be destroyed would be transported to designated depots for disassembly, removal of fissionable material, and destruction of the remaining components. The destruction of these weapons would be demonstrated to nationals of both parties and to neutral observers in accordance with arrangements for such demonstration set forth in a Technical Annex to the document of agreement. To be acceptable, demonstration procedures would not compromise information classified in the interest of the national security of the participants or be likely to lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology.

E. The participation of other nuclear powers would be invited, but such participation would not be considered essential to the initial agreement presented above.